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Abstract 
 
In this paper we present comparable results on the determinants of firms’ investment 
and their link to monetary policy. The results have been obtained by the Eurosystem 
Monetary Transmission Network. This network has produced a series of papers in 
which the use of micro data permits estimating and quantifying the relevance of two 
channels of monetary policy transmission: the interest rate and the broad credit 
channel. The research findings provide evidence of an operative interest rate channel 
in all countries examined. Moreover, the results indicate that variables which proxy 
firms’ financial conditions play a role. Firms characterised by weaker balance sheets 
show higher liquidity sensitivity.  
 
 
JEL Classification numbers: E22, E50 
Keywords: investment, monetary transmission, user cost of capital 
 
 
 
 
This paper represents the authors’ personal opinions and does not necessarily reflect 
the views of the institutions to which they are affiliated. We would like to thank the 
members of the Eurosystem’s Monetary Transmission Network, Christopher Allsopp, 
Michael Artis, Paul Mizen, an anonymous referee, and the participants at the 
conference ‘EMU, Four Years On’, for helpful discussions and feedback 
 
 
                                                          
1 PSE, Cepremap and University Paris 10, e-mail: jean-bernard.chatelain@u-paris10.fr; 
2 Banca d’Italia; e-mail: generale.andrea@insedia.interbusiness.it;  
3 Banco de España; e-mail: hernando@bde.es; 
4 Deutsche Bundesbank; e-mail: ulf.von-kalckreuth@bundesbank.de;  
5 European Central Bank: e-mail: philip.vermeulen@ecb.int.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Business investment decisions are thought to be influenced by monetary policy 
through two important channels. First, changes in market interest rates imply changes 
in the cost of capital, which in turn affect investment decisions. This is known as the 
interest rate channel. Second, changes in market interest rates might affect firms 
differently. Given imperfect capital markets, firms with less collateral to offer might 
see the terms they face in the debt market worsen more than others when market 
interest rates rise. This is generally referred to as the broad credit channel.  
This article provides an overview of new findings on the existence of these two 
channels based on results from a series of studies on firm investment in the euro area. 
As in its companion paper (Ehrmann et al., this issue), it reports on the main findings 
obtained by the Eurosystem Monetary Transmission Network. This network has 
produced a set of comparable papers investigating the determinants of investment. A 
special feature of these papers is their use of firm panel datasets to identify the 
relative importance of the interest rate and broad credit channels. In addition, they use 
similar methodologies. Especially in the study by Chatelain et al. (2001), the results of 
harmonised regressions are compared among the four largest countries in the euro 
area. Although harmonised regressions make comparison between countries more 
straightforward, they need to be interpreted with caution. By default, individual 
country idiosyncrasies are not taken into account. Individual country results in which 
country-specific features are taken into account are available for Germany (von 
Kalckreuth, 2001), France (Chatelain and Tiomo, 2001), Italy (Gaiotti and Generale, 
2001), Belgium (Butzen et al., 2001), Austria (Valderrama, 2001) and Luxembourg 
(Lünnemann and Mathä, 2001).  
The rest of the article is structured as follows. In section II we describe the motivation 
behind the analysis. In section III we describe the theoretical framework. In section 
IV we present data and regression results. In section V we provide an assessment of 
the magnitude of the interest rate channel. In section VI we report on evidence of 
whether a broad credit channel is operative in the euro area. Finally, conclusions are 
provided in the last section of the article.  
II. MOTIVATION 
The interest of central banks in the causes of investment fluctuations is natural. 
Investment fluctuations probably represent the most important part of cyclical 
changes in the business cycle in the euro area. Vermeulen (2002) reports that the 
decline in gross fixed capital formation was the major cause of the decline in total 
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domestic expenditure during the downturn in the early 1990s in Europe. In addition, 
investment fluctuations are generally believed to be closely linked to monetary policy.  
Macroeconomic models at central banks also assign a large role to investment 
fluctuations after monetary policy shocks. Van Els et al. (2001) report on simulations 
carried out using central bank aggregate models. They find that after an increase in 
the policy-controlled interest rate in the euro area, the decrease in investment accounts 
for between 30 to 50 percent of the drop in GDP during the first year. This share rises 
to as much as 80 percent of the fall in GDP after three years.   
Policy-makers at central banks are naturally interested in the channels through which 
interest rate changes affect investment. They need to know whether only the interest 
rate channel is at work or whether the condition of a firm’s balance sheet also matters 
after monetary policy shocks. If balance sheet conditions are important, financial 
condition indicators might provide useful additional information beyond traditional 
interest rate information. Macro-models usually do not include balance sheet 
information on firms and are therefore ill-suited to testing for the presence of broad 
credit channel effects.   
Microanalysis of firm investment is generally better suited to identifying the different 
channels through which investment is affected. In studies using aggregate investment 
data, it has often been hard to identify user cost effects on investment and therefore 
the existence of an interest rate channel. Micro data on firms have a major advantage 
in providing user cost variation in both time and cross-section dimensions. In 
addition, the broad credit channel emphasises the effect of balance sheet strength on 
investment response. Firm datasets allow separating firms with weak balance sheets 
from firms with strong ones. This makes it possible to identify broad credit channel 
effects. Below we describe the theoretical framework used by the Eurosystem 
researchers in identifying both channels. 
III. THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The models in the investment literature can be divided into two broad categories 
depending on whether dynamic elements are treated implicitly or explicitly (Chirinko, 
1993a, 1993b). Models are included in the latter category if dynamic elements appear 
explicitly in the optimisation problem and if the estimated coefficients are linked 
explicitly to the underlying technology and expectation parameters. The implicit 
category contains those investment models that do not meet these criteria. Explicit 
models have the notable advantages of being based on a choice-theoretic framework 
and having coefficients in the econometric equation that can be identified with 
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technology and expectation parameters. However, their empirical performance has 
been disappointing, their parameter estimates appear fragile in many applications, and 
they do not provide a framework for assessing either the interest rate or broad credit 
channels for investment. Consequently, the Eurosystem researchers have opted for an 
implicit model. The model platform corresponds to that used recently by, among 
others, Bond et al., (1999, 2003), Chirinko et al. (1999), Hall et al. (1999, 2001), von 
Kalckreuth (2000), Harhoff and Ramb (2001), as well as Bloom et al. (2001). The 
point of departure is the static neo-classical equation for capital demand. Using a 
generalised CES production function, Eisner and Nadiri (1968) derive the following 
linear equation from the first-order conditions of profit maximisation: 
tttt hUCSK loglogloglog +σ−θ= ,      (1) 
with 


ν
σ−+σ=θ 1  and ( )σν−σ να⋅= 1tt Ah  ,     (2) 
where tUC  is the user cost of capital, tS  is real sales, tA  is productivity and σ  and ν  
are the elasticities of substitution and scale, respectively. The variable th  depends on 
the time-varying term tA . If the presence of a firm-specific trend in capital demand 
cannot be excluded, e.g. because the growth of tA  is firm-specific, it is helpful to first 
difference equation (1): 
 tttt hUCSK loglogloglog ∆+∆σ−∆θ=∆  .     (3) 
The first term, tKlog∆ , is approximately equal to the net investment rate, δ−−1tt KI . 
The depreciation rate can be subsumed into the unobservable firm-specific variable in 
the estimation. The change in thlog  can be represented by time dummies in the 
regression equation, at least as far as aggregate productivity is concerned, and by 
individual constants in order to catch trends of the form tiφ  in the course of the firm's 
technological progress. Individual productivity shocks are confined to the error term 
of the equation. 
 In the following, it is assumed that the production possibilities are given by the 
capital stock at the beginning of the current period. Taking account of installation 
costs and the short-run dynamics in the formation of expectations, one can generalise 
the static capital-demand equation by using distributed lags. For firm i, this results in: 
 tititititi UCLCSLBKLA ,,,, log)(log)(log)( ε+λ+φ+∆σ+∆θ=∆ ,  (4) 
)(),(),( LCLBLA  being polynomials in the lag operator, not necessarily of the same 
degree. The latent term is composed of a firm-specific constant iφ  that reflects 
depreciation and a possible trend in the capital-demand equation (1), a time-specific 
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shock tλ  equal for all firms, and finally, an idiosyncratic transitory shock ti,ε . In this 
quite general specification, the data are allowed to determine the adaptation dynamics. 
Imposing the additional constraints 1)1()1( =AB  and 1)1()1( =AC , the long-run 
effects of changes in the level of sales or user costs are the same as in the static model 
(1). In the regression, the growth rates tiK ,log∆  and lags are substituted by current 
and lagged values of investment outlays per unit of capital, 1,, −titi KI .  
In addition, one can also estimate an extension of equation (4). Contemporaneous and 
lagged real cash-flow per unit of capital, 1,, −titi KCF  are added as further regressors 
to capture financial constraints and possible dynamics of expectation formation.1 This 
yields:  
tititititititi KCFLDUCLCSLBKLA ,1,,,,, )(log)(log)(log)( ε+λ+φ++∆σ+∆θ=∆ −  
(5) 
Following Auerbach (1983) and Hayashi (2000), one can obtain a weighted-average 
definition of the user cost of capital where the cost of debt and equity are weighted by 
their respective share of the total liabilities of the firm. Chatelain et al. (2001) use the 
accounting proportions of debt and equity which matters for taxation: 
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where s is the sector-specific index, stp  the price of final goods, 
I
stp  the price of 
capital goods of sector s; tτ  the corporate income tax rate, against which interest 
payments and depreciation are assumed to be deductible, z the present value of 
depreciation allowances, and itc the investment tax credit. AI is the apparent interest 
rate, measured as interest payment over gross debt, LD the long-term debt rate used as 
a proxy for the opportunity cost of equity, E the book value of equity, D the book 
value of debt, and sδ  the industry-specific rate of economic depreciation. 
IV. THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS  
The analysis of monetary transmission through firm investment within the 
Eurosystem’s Monetary Transmission Network has been mainly based on the use of 
firm balance sheet data collected by the NCBs of the euro area. The richness of these 
                                                          
1 Chirinko and von Kalckreuth (2002) develop this equation by introducing delivery lags and adaptive 
expectations. However, as in all implicit models, the parameters belonging to the expectation formation 
mechanism are not separately identified. 
 5
databases (in particular, in their cross-sectional dimension)2 makes them especially 
suitable for identifying the different transmission channels. Although these databases 
differ in many respects, in general, their coverage of the population of small and 
unlisted companies is higher than that which is standard in comparable empirical 
studies. And, in spite of being generally biased towards larger firms, these databases 
are reasonably representative of the corporate sector of these countries. 
In order to better address the challenge of making cross-country comparisons on the 
impact of monetary policy on firm investment, Chatelain et al. (2001) make a further 
harmonising effort. In that paper, which focuses on the four largest economies in the 
euro area, additional attempts are made to standardise, to the extent feasible, the 
definition of the variables and to homogenise the composition of the samples. In 
particular, the analysis is restricted to the manufacturing sector and the period covered 
by the samples used in the estimations is 1985-1999, with the exception of Germany 
for which the time period available for estimation is 1988-1997. The total number of 
observations is over 200,000 and the coverage of the samples ranges from 19 percent 
for Spain to 42 percent for Germany3.  
Chatelain et al. (2001) estimate a common specification, using the same estimation 
method, for the four largest countries of the euro area, France, Germany, Italy and 
Spain. Thus, the comparison of results obtained across countries provides a first 
indication of the existence of asymmetries in the transmission mechanism through 
firm investment4. Furthermore, companion research undertaken within the Monetary 
Transmission Network of the Eurosystem (Valderrama, 2001, Butzen et al., 2001, and 
Lünnemann and Mathä, 2001) performs a similar analysis for other countries in the 
euro area. These papers, although adopting a country-specific approach in order to 
take into account national particularities, share with Chatelain et al. the main elements 
of the analytical framework and, therefore, offer a set of comparable results for other 
countries in the euro area5. An important difference from Chatelain et al. (2001) is that 
the firms in the samples used in these papers are not exclusively from the 
manufacturing sector.  
Table 1 provides summary statistics of the studies by Chatelain et al. (2001), 
Valderrama (2001), Butzen et al. (2001) and Lünneman and Mathä (2001). The table 
                                                          
2 In this respect, the annual accounts database of the National Bank of Belgium used in Butzen et al. 
(2001), which covers almost the entire population of Belgian firms, is especially remarkable. 
3 See Chatelain et al. (2001) for additional details on the datasets. 
4 Note, however, that since cross-country comparisons are not performed on a pooled dataset, a formal 
test on the significance of the differences is precluded. 
5 See also Chatelain and Tiomo (2001), Gaiotti and Generale (2001) and von Kalckreuth (2001) for 
country-specific studies on the link between monetary policy and firm investment in France, Italy and 
Germany, respectively. 
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shows the investment/capital ratio, real sales growth, real user cost growth and the 
cash-flow/capital ratio. The summary statistics for the four largest euro area countries 
are broadly similar, revealing that manufacturing firms in those countries are 
comparable. The average investment rate for French and Italian firms is somewhat 
lower than German and Spanish firms. Spanish firms also have the highest sales 
growth rate. The better performance of Spanish firms in terms of both investment and 
sales probably reflects the overall growth performance of Spain in the 1990s. Italian 
firms have lower cash-flows. Comparisons of national averages have to be interpreted 
with caution however, because, as is usually the case with panel data, there is a wide 
dispersion of the variables in all the countries studied. The summary statistics of the 
Austrian, Belgian and Luxembourg samples are not strictly comparable. For instance, 
40% of the firms in the Luxembourg sample are outside the manufacturing sector. 
This might explain the relatively low average investment-to-capital ratio.   
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
  I/K ∆log S (c)  ∆log UC CF/K (a) 
  Mean Std.d. Mean Std.d. Mean Std.d. Mean Std.d. 
          
Panel A: 
          
France  0.122 0.141 0.029 0.153 -0.009 0.140 0.330 0.330 
          
Germany  0.181 0.219 0.021 0.158 0.025 0.110 0.276 0.464 
          
Italy  0.124 0.155 0.034 0.196 -0.012 0.263 0.196 0.220 
          
Spain  0.186 0.217 0.043 0.171 0.006 0.150 0.370 0.469 
          
          
Panel B: 
          
Austria(a)  0.099 0.091 0.032 0.145 n.a. n.a. 0.484 0.330 
          
Belgium(b)(c)  0.169 0.233 -0.013 0.323 -0.009 0.559 0.346 0.657 
          
Luxembourg(a)  0.052 0.227 0.003 0.180 -0.052 0.347 0.822 3.313 
 
Notes: (a) For Austria and Luxembourg, liquid assets instead of cash-flow. 
(b) The reported statistics are those corresponding to the sample of large firms. 
(c) For Belgium, value-added growth instead of sales growth. 
Sources: Panel A: Chatelain et al. (2001); Panel B : Austria: Valderrama (2001); Belgium: Butzen et al. 
(2001); Luxembourg: Lünneman and Mathä (2001). 
 
Equations (4) and (5) have been estimated in a harmonised fashion in Chatelain et al. 
(2001) for France, Germany, Italy and Spain. The results are summarised in panel A 
of table 2. A similar analysis is conducted in the country-specific studies of 
Valderrama (2001), Butzen et al. (2001) and Lünnemann and Mathä (2001) for 
Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg, respectively. In these papers, comparable results 
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to those presented in Chatelain et al. can be found and are reported in panel B of table 
2. In both panels, we limit ourselves to reporting only the estimated long-run 
coefficients that represent the long-run elasticity of the capital stock with respect to 
the regressors6. 
 
Table 2: Long-run coefficients 
 Equation (4)  Equation (5) 
 Without CF/K in the regression  With CF/K in the regression 
 Sales(c) User cost  Sales(c) User cost Cash-flow(a) 
 
Panel A: Estimation results with an harmonised approach 
       
France 0.35** 
(0.04) 
-0.11** 
(0.05) 
 0.12** 
(0.05) 
-0.03 
(0.04) 
0.20** 
(0.04) 
       
Germany 0.45** 
(0.07) 
-0.66** 
(0.17) 
 0.39** 
(0.08) 
-0.52** 
(0.15) 
0.08* 
(0.03) 
       
Italy 0.29** 
(0.05) 
-0.11** 
(0.04) 
 0.14** 
(0.05) 
-0.20** 
(0.06) 
0.30** 
(0.03) 
       
Spain 0.14* 
(0.09) 
-0.26 
(0.20) 
 0.02 
(0.09) 
-0.28 
(0.20) 
0.15** 
(0.04) 
 
Panel B: Estimation results of firm studies for single countries 
       
Austria(a) 0.27** 
(0.02) 
-0.14 
(0.39) 
 0.02 
(0.84) 
-0.04 
(0.72) 
0.28** 
(0.00) 
       
Belgium(b)(c) n.a. n.a.  0.31** 
(n.a.) 
-0.03** 
(n.a.) 
0.21** 
(n.a.) 
       
Luxembourg(a)(d) 0.08** 
(0.04) 
-0.10** 
(0.04) 
 0.08** 
(0.04) 
-0.15** 
(0.05) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
       
Notes: */** denotes significance at the 5%/1% levels. Numbers in brackets are standard errors. 
Estimation method: two step GMM of equation (1) and (2) in first differences. For details on the 
estimation technique and the instrumentation see Chatelain et al (2001). 
(a) Model (2) for Austria and Luxembourg includes liquid assets instead of cash-flow. 
(b) The results for Belgium are those corresponding to the sample of manufacturing firms. 
(c) For Belgium, value-added growth instead of sales growth. 
(d) In the case of Luxembourg the estimation method is OLS. 
Sources: Panel A: Chatelain et al. (2001); Panel B : Austria: Valderrama (2001); Belgium: Butzen et al. 
(2001); Luxembourg: Lünneman and Mathä (2001). 
 
User costs have a significant long-run effect on capital stock in Germany, Italy, 
Belgium and Luxembourg, and for France when cash-flow is dropped from the 
regression. Moreover, Chatelain et al (2001) note that it is also significant for Spain 
when non-significant lags are excluded. The point estimates of the long-run elasticity 
of capital stock with respect to user costs lay in a range of -0.03 to –0.66. In a recent 
study using similar methodology, Chirinko et al. (1999) find an elasticity of –0.25 for 
                                                          
6 The long-run coefficients are calculated as the sum of the coefficients of the various lags of the indicated 
variable, divided by one minus the sum of the coefficients on the lagged endogenous variable. 
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US manufacturing firms. However, they provide other estimates in the neighbourhood 
of –0.40 using another methodology (Chirinko et al., 2001).  
Chatelain and Tiomo (2001) suggest a reason for the loss in significance of long-run 
user cost elasticity in France when the cash-flow/capital ratio enters the regression. 
They argue that this is due to an omitted variables bias. When not only cash-flow but 
also cash-flow multiplied by dummy variables related to the risk of bankruptcy of 
firms (e.g. using Fisher discriminant analysis with several financial ratios) are 
included in the specification, long-run user cost elasticity becomes significant again 
with a value similar to that in the specification without cash-flow. They then find that 
about 80% of the firms in the French sample exhibit an investment cash-flow 
sensitivity significant but close to zero (similar to firms in the German sample), with a 
user cost elasticity significant but at a much lower level (below -0.26) than in 
Germany. By contrast, risky firms (about 20% of the French sample) exhibit 
investment cash-flow sensitivity and user cost elasticity rather similar to that in the 
Italian and Spanish samples. This French result is particularly interesting since it 
demonstrates that even within a relatively homogenous sample of manufacturing 
firms, sub-samples of firms can behave quite differently from the average firm in the 
sample.  
It is interesting to see that Germany has the lowest cash-flow sensitivity among the 
large European countries, whereas its user cost elasticity is highest. Furthermore, von 
Kalckreuth (2001) does not find significant differences between the investment 
behaviour of large and small firms in Germany. He argues that it is possible to 
interpret this result as being related to a special feature of the German financial 
system, the importance of so-called house banks7. The term “house bank” is used to 
denote a credit institution which enters into a long-term business relationship with a 
certain company based on an intensive exchange of information and implied 
insurance against liquidity shortfalls and sharp fluctuations in refinancing costs. It is 
possible that relationship banking has helped firms, especially small firms, to 
overcome informational asymmetries that otherwise would have distorted their 
investment decisions.  
Overall, the significance of the user cost variable in the regressions suggests that 
monetary policy has a significant influence on corporate investment in the euro area 
through the interest rate channel. However, the exact amount of user cost elasticity 
remains sensitive to the inclusion of cash-flow in the regression (and to the sample of 
firms). 
                                                          
7 See von Kalckreuth (2001) and Deutsche Bundesbank (2002). For the house banking principle, see Elsas and 
Krahnen (1998). 
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Sales growth, as a proxy for expected demand, has a substantial impact on the 
investment rate and, with the exceptions of Austria and Spain, this effect is significant 
even in models including cash-flow. Consistent with most of the previous empirical 
literature, cash-flow is significant in each country, with the exception of 
Luxembourg8. The potential relevance of a broad credit channel is addressed in 
section VI. 
V. THE DYNAMICS OF INVESTMENT 
In this section we present the short-run profile of the investment/capital ratio in the 
different euro area countries after shocks to user costs and cash-flow. The profile of 
the investment/capital ratio after shocks to user costs is especially interesting for 
policy-makers at central banks. In principal, policy-makers can influence user costs 
by changing the market interest rate. Changes in market interest rates should lead to 
changes in user costs since they are an element of user costs. Clearly, user costs also 
contain other elements such as tax parameters, price variables and depreciation. 
Changes in market interest rates therefore do not lead to one-to-one changes in user 
costs. Chatelain et al. (2001) provide estimates of the elasticity of user costs to 
changes in the market interest rate ranging from 0.32 in Germany to 0.70 in Italy.  
 
Table 3. Effect of a one-time 1 percentage point change in the user cost 
growth on I/K (*) 
  
 Germany France(a)  Italy Spain 
  
t -0.22 -0.06 -0.08 -0.28 
t+1 -0.18 -0.05 -0.07 -0.05 
t+2 -0.08 -0.01 -0.03 0.03 
t+3 -0.03 0.00 -0.01 0.02 
     
 Austria Belgium Luxembourg  
     
t -0.02 -0.01 -0.15  
t+1 -0.02 -0.01 -0.04  
t+2 0.00 -0.01 -0.01  
t+3 0.00 -0.01 0.00  
Notes: (*) Figures represent the deviation of I/K after a 1% increase in the user cost 
growth rate.  
(a) For France the coefficients are from the regression without cash-flow .  
Sources: Chatelain et al. (2001); The figures for Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg 
have been obtained from the estimates reported in Valderrama (2001), Butzen et al. 
(2001) and Lünnemann and Mathä (2001), respectively. 
 
Table 3 shows the effect of a one percentage point change in the growth rate of user 
costs on the investment/capital ratio. Although the magnitude of the effects differs 
                                                          
8 Even in this case, a significant (although small) coefficient for cash-flow is obtained, when using a 
Within estimator. 
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quite a lot across countries (as was evident from table 2), the dynamic pattern is quite 
similar across countries. The largest effect occurs in the first year. Most of the effect 
disappears after two years.  
Table 4 shows the effect of a one percentage point change in the cash flowcapital 
ratio. In general, the contemporaneous impact is significant and most of the effect is 
also here disappeared after the second year. On the whole these effects, although 
relatively small in most countries, are by no means negligible9.  
 
Table 4. Effect on I/K of a one-time 1 percentage point  change in 
CF/K (*) 
  
 Germany France  Italy Spain 
  
t 0.04 0.06 0.26 0.12 
t+1 0.02 0.10 0.02 0.05 
t+2 0.01 0.03 0.02 -0.01 
t+3 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 
     
 Austria Belgium Luxembourg  
     
t 0.20 0.04 0.00  
t+1 0.08 0.10 0.00  
t+2 0.00 0.01 0.00  
t+3 0.00 0.04 0.00  
Note: (*) Figures represent the deviation of I/K after a 1 percentage point  increase in 
CF/K.  
Sources: Chatelain et al. (2001); The figures for Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg have 
been obtained from the estimates reported in Valderrama (2001), Butzen et al. (2001) and 
Lünnemann and Mathä (2001), respectively. 
 
 
 
VI. THE BROAD CREDIT CHANNEL.  
 
In this section we report on the results of tests of whether different categories of firms 
show different investment reactions depending on their liquidity.  
Table 5 provides an overview of the effect of liquidity on investment in six euro area 
countries including results from Valderrama (2001), Butzen et al. (2001), Chatelain 
and Tiomo (2001), von Kalckreuth (2001), Lünnemann and Mathä (2001) and Gaiotti 
and Generale (2001). These studies tested the differences in the coefficient estimates 
of the cash-flow/capital ratio10. By testing whether the long-run effect of the cash-
flow/capital ratio is significantly different for different groups of firms, they were able 
to compare the behaviour of firms that tend to have weaker balance sheets with that of 
other firms. This test aims at identifying possible broad credit channel effects.  
                                                          
9 See Chatelain et al. (2001) for an estimation of the effect of an increase in interest rate on investment, 
induced through a reduction in cash-flow. 
10 The Austrian and Luxembourg study did not use cash-flow but rather cash stock as their liquidity measure. 
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Table 5: Country findings for broad credit channel effects 
 Model specification Results: relevant firm 
characteristics 
 Sample period No. of obs Highest Liquidity sensitivity 
Austria 1994-1999 2652 Firms with no close relationship to 
a house bank 
Belgium 1986-1998 157547 Small services, manufacturing 
France 1986-1999 61237 Equipment manufacturing, firms 
with bad credit rating 
Germany 1988-1997 44345 Firms with bad credit rating 
Italy 1984-1999 43912 Small firms, firms with high share 
of intangible assets 
Luxembourg 1992-1998 517 Young firms 
Sources: Austria: Valderrama (2001); Belgium: Butzen et al. (2001); France: Chatelain and 
Tiomo (2001); Germany: von Kalckreuth (2001); Italy: Gaiotti and Generale (2001); 
Luxembourg (2001) Lünnemann and Mathä (2001). 
No single criterion was found to be relevant in all countries by which firms are more 
sensitive to liquidity. For example, size in itself does not seem to be sufficient to 
capture the presence of differences in external finance premia11. However, all criteria 
that are relevant in individual countries point towards firms with less potential to 
provide adequate collateral. We take these differences in liquidity sensitivity to be 
indicative of potential broad credit channel effects. For instance, in both France and 
Germany, firms with poor credit ratings show higher cash-flow sensitivity. In Italy 
and Belgium, small firms are more sensitive to cash-flow. Also, particular industries 
could be more vulnerable to credit channel effects. Small services firms in Belgium 
and equipment manufacturers in France are found to be more liquidity sensitive. For 
Austria, firms without a close relationship to a house bank show higher liquidity 
sensitivity. In the case of Spain, although according to Chatelain et al. (2001) the 
investment behaviour of small firms does not display a significantly higher cash-flow 
sensitivity than that of large firms, the large magnitude of the cash-flow effect, its 
robustness to changes in the specification and the evidence obtained for the Spanish 
economy using alternative specifications, datasets, sample periods and split criteria 
seem to support the relevance of informational asymmetries to explain investment 
behaviour12. 
                                                          
11 Hernando and Tiomo (2002), estimating the investment Euler equation model of Bond and Meghir (1994) for 
two samples of firms (French and Spanish) very similar to the ones used in this study, find a significantly higher 
cash-flow sensitivity for those firms paying zero dividends. Chatelain and Teurlai (2000) estimating the investment 
Euler equation model where the financial constraint is designed according to Estrada and Vallés (1998) for a 
French sample, find similar results for low dividend payout firms and for debt increasing firms, using tests of 
misspecification of cash-flow for various groups of firms. Thus, it can be argued that size might not always be the 
best indicator of informational asymmetries.  
12 See, for instance, Alonso-Borrego (1994), Estrada and Vallés (1998) and Hernando and Tiomo (2002). 
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For Germany, it was possible to obtain evidence of the effect of financial constraints  
that does not rely on the traditional method of comparing cash-flow sensitivities 
between supposedly constrained and unconstrained firms. Von Kalckreuth (2001) 
views the rating score (overall rating ratio, ORR) of the Deutsche Bundesbank – being 
the result of a discriminant analysis – as a direct measure of the perceived default risk 
as seen from the perspective of the lender. Therefore, it ought to vary with the 
external finance premium, if there is one. Technically, the costs of finance are 
modelled as the risk free user costs of capital, augmented by a mark up that is a 
function of the rating score, ORR. An autoregressive distributed lag equation was 
estimated with both the change in ORR and the growth rate of a risk-free user cost 
variable that was constructed according to the principles laid down by King and 
Fullerton (1984). Since user costs enter the model with a negative effect, we would 
anticipate that ∆ORR has a positive coefficient, indicating that investment increases 
with the credit rating. This effect could actually be verified. Using a GMM procedure, 
the rating variable was found to be significant on the 1% level. The size of the 
coefficient indicates that rating is of importance for capital accumulation, although 
not overwhelmingly so: a permanent increase in rating by one standard deviation 
would increase capital demand by 2.4% in the long run.  
Overall, considering the above results, one can be reasonably confident that internal 
funds are a crucial determinant of firms’ investment, with an effect that is stronger for 
firms that are more likely to face financial constraints, so that the credit channel in the 
euro area is also operative. 
VII. CONCLUSION  
This article has presented a comparable set of results on the monetary transmission 
channel on investment in the euro area countries. These results have been obtained by 
the Eurosystem Monetary Transmission Network in a series of papers using firm 
panel datasets. Evidence for both interest rate channel effects and broad credit channel 
effects is found. There is clear evidence that user costs matter for investment. Most of 
the effect of user cost changes on investment can be found during the first two years. 
Investment by various firms responds differently depending on cash-flow and 
liquidity variables. Investment by firms with weaker balance sheets especially 
displays higher liquidity sensitivity indicating the presence of broad credit channel 
effects.  
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